I’ve been working on Anvil, an experimental payment network that replaces competitive mining with sustained participation.
Instead of PoW races or stake-based selection, nodes earn rewards via time-weighted effectiveness: staying online, responding to challenges, and participating consistently over time. Rewards are normalized across participants, making large-scale Sybil attacks economically inefficient rather than forbidden.
The current prototype includes a leader-based BFT consensus, account-based ledger, participation tracking, and a local web wallet with optional mining. I’ve also built a simulation suite and adversarial tests to explore attack economics.
This is early, experimental. I’m mainly interested in feedback on the economic model, participation mechanics, and failure modes.
This is intentionally not optimized for speculative yield; it’s an exploration of participation-driven incentives.
Hi HN,
I’ve been working on Anvil, an experimental payment network that replaces competitive mining with sustained participation.
Instead of PoW races or stake-based selection, nodes earn rewards via time-weighted effectiveness: staying online, responding to challenges, and participating consistently over time. Rewards are normalized across participants, making large-scale Sybil attacks economically inefficient rather than forbidden.
The current prototype includes a leader-based BFT consensus, account-based ledger, participation tracking, and a local web wallet with optional mining. I’ve also built a simulation suite and adversarial tests to explore attack economics.
This is early, experimental. I’m mainly interested in feedback on the economic model, participation mechanics, and failure modes.
This is intentionally not optimized for speculative yield; it’s an exploration of participation-driven incentives.